## Boris F. Hlebec\*

University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philology Serbia

# **SEMANTIC EXPLORATION INTO POSSESSION**

UDC 811.111'37 Original scientific paper

In this paper the author analyzes all lexical meanings of the verb *have* and gives their scientific definitions. The analysis is based upon the collocational method, devised by the author in his later works. The author identifies (groups of) sememes and explains their relationships. Occasionally, grammatical behavior has also been revealed. The author also mentions certain psychological and sociological correlations of the concept of possession.

**Key Words**: collocation, collocational method, lexical meanings, lexical meanings of the verb have, concept of possession in society.

It is notorious that common everyday abstract words (like happy, free and life) are most elusive when a lexicographer or a lexicologist wants to define them. Words denoting possession (like have, own, possess) belong in this group. To mention OALD as a random choice, have in its primary meaning is defined as own, hold or possess, own as have something that belongs to somebody, while possess is defined as (formal) have or own, thus completing the vicious circle.

While *directives* (nouns appearing in the semantic definitions of verbs and adjectives, so-called according to Wiggins 1971: 26) of *have* pose little problem, an effort is required to discover the meanings proper (Wiggins's *analyses*) of this verb. This can be done best by experimenting, using the verb *have* in sentences and strings of words that highlight certain aspects of its meanings, and using dictionaries as sources. Archaic or dated usage as well as auxiliary *have*, have not been included. To separate different lexical meanings (sememes) the test of zeugma (see Cruse 1986; 13; Hlebec 2010: 19, 44, 54) will be applied, i.e. the test whether two different collocates of *have* can be joined with a single mention of *have*. For instance, a sentence occurring in Fromm (1979: 31)

<sup>\*</sup> University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philology, Studentski trg 3, 11000 Beograd, Serbia; e-mail: boris.jesensek@gmail.com

(1)I have a beautiful house, nice children, and a happy marriage

shows that there is no zeugma when conjoining *house*, *children* and *marriage* as object directives of a single *have* in the same clause. This is a useful checking method, although sometimes the speaker/investigator may be in doubt, as in

(2)?He has an ambition to become a writer and a problem how to become one.

To discover the semantic material for the definitions of the various sememes of *have*, Hlebec's collocational method (see Hlebec 1998, 2007; 2008a, b, c, 2010, 2011) has been applied throughout.

## 1. Possession sensu strictu

Starting from Wierzbicka's discussion of the basic meaning of *have*, where she suggests that the possessors of *have* can (= have a certain power to) do with their possession what they want (1988: 345), the primary meanings of *have* can be defined as *have* 1 and *have* 2 in the following way, reducing it to its semantic components:

**1** <# living thing# is with power to use  $\# sth^2 / time\# > I$  have a lot of books. She has pension and a maid to help her. I have not enough time. I had five minutes to escape the danger. The bear has its den. My plants have good soil/enough light. She has a happy marriage. We have good schools. He has a bakery. Suppose you have a row of cells. They have chewing gums at Smith's. **2** <#living thing<sub>1</sub># is with power to use  $\# thing_2\#$  when living thing<sub>1</sub> is at the same place and time as thing<sub>2</sub> {in living thing<sub>1</sub>'s hand(s)} > I have enough water here. He had the bar to himself. I have with me Professor Jones, who will help you explain this.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Although Goddard and Wierzbicka added 'have' to their list of semantic primes (2002). According to the present author, 'power' can be analyzed as 'strong event in body/mind' and 'body' is 'all parts of sb<sub>1</sub> that sb<sub>2</sub> can see/touch (= be at the same part of space as part of sb)'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The seme 'sth' (= 'something') includes notions of 'thing', 'event', and 'social place' (as in *have a job/position/post*), while the seme 'thing' is meant to cover both inanimate things and living

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The addition within braces refers to the typical, most obvious situation.

He had with him a copy of a London paper.  $\bf 3$  <# living thing\_1# comes to be with physical power to use  $\# sth_1\#$  {when living thing\_1 is at the same place and time as  $sth_1$ } (when living thing\_2 is a source of  $sth_1$ )> She had a present from him. Have a seat! Tom is going to have a letter and a phone call.

That power is an essential property of the meaning of *have* 1 is also reflected in Erich Fromm's discussion on the having mode in societies. "The person who owns private property is its sole master with full power to deprive others of its use and enjoyment" (Fromm: 1979: 75).

The essence of the primary meaning of *have* (*have* 2) is most obvious when possession is attributed to an animal. If a bird is said to have a worm, it has probably caught it and holds it ready to eat. The power with which the bird is vested is a purely physical (biological) capability of consumption. The following sentences show that the kind of power to use a thing when humans are in question varies in contexts considerably.

- (3)I have a cottage in the mountains, but the only road leading to it is ruined, so I can never go there.
- (= I am with legal power to use the cottage, but I am without physical power to use it.)
  - (4) Pete has a car, but he has stolen it.
- (= Pete is with physical and mental power to use the car, but he is without legal power to use the car.)
  - (5)Tom has a car, but he cannot drive it because he has not yet learned how to drive/because he has not got the license.

(= Tom is with legal power to use the car, i.e. he has the right to sell the car as an owner, but he is without mental/legal power to use the car as a driver.)

- (6) Johnny had two books that had been saved after the shipwreck, but he couldn't read them because he was illiterate,
- (= Johnny is with physical power to use the books, but he is without mental power to use them.)
  - (7) Mike keeps a fettered bear. But the bear has its den, and it suffers in captivity.

(The bear is with moral/? legal power to use the den, but it is without physical power to use it under the circumstances.). If there is a law that prohibits keeping bears in captivity, than the power is a legal one, but if there is not, moral power is the only possible explanation for the use of have in this sentence. This example also shows that non-physical power to use something when applied to animals is derived from a human community (speakers) in the same way as when applied to people. It is highly doubtful that a bear feels that it has the right to use a den. Rather, it feels an instinct or urge to do so, but this is not called having.

If we in

(8) We have a wide range of products.

refers to salesmen who are not the owners of the products at the same time, the verb *have* means 'be with power to use products for sale'.

This means that the primary *have* sometimes includes physical or mental and sometimes legal or even moral power. 'Legal' or 'moral power' is in everyday parlance *one's right* to do something. Further, there are several subtypes of legal power, such as the right to have at one's disposal, to control, to make free use of, or to sell. These various kinds of possession are allosemes of a single sememe, as proven by the lack of zeugma in

- (9) Both Jim and Tom have a car. But while Jim owns his, Tom has stolen one.
- (10) Ralph has hundreds of (inherited) books, while Ann only twenty. But Ralph is blind and cannot read them.

In the meaning 'be with legal power to use', *have* is used only in general statements, not in deictically referring expressions. Instead of

(11a) \*John has that car,

one would say

- (11b) John owns that car.
- (12) John has that car today.

would be said in the sense 'be using', i.e. 'be with physical power and permission to use' (Dixon, 2005: 124; 362). This means that *have* is used, as our semantic definition states, either for a general possession (*have* 1) or as a concrete instance of using something (as *have* 2), but not both at the same time. According to Lyons, the answer to

(13) Where is the book?

can be

(14) John has it.

Here *have* is used as a locative copula, and *John* as a variant of the underlying locative subject. This answer has the same function as

(15) It's on the table (Lyons 1977: 723).

As we see it, this happens due to the prototypical meaning of *have* 2, i.e. hold (in one's hands). Metonymically, if somebody holds a thing, it is at the place where somebody is situated.

(16) I have a lot of Shakespeare's plays at home and a copy of *Hamlet* with me.

proves that *have* 1 and *have* 2 are closely connected in meaning. But we still prefer to consider them separate sememes because of zeugmas in sentences such as (11) and

(17) \*She had a pension (= 'she received a pension regularly') and \$ 100 on her.

In have 3 the contextual verbal aspect of have is inchoative (specifying the beginning of an action) instead of typical stative (cf. Hlebec 2007: 123) as a result of mentioning a past or future tense instead of the present and mentioning the source of having, or as a result of some other linguistic and extra-linguistic factors. Sometimes this happens with a rare use of the passive, as in

(18) There is nothing to be had here (SOED s.v. have).

# 2. Functional proximity

Next group of sememes also contains the semic cluster 'is (be) with', but without 'power to use' to accompany it:

 $\bf 4$  <#sb<sub>1</sub># is with #sb<sub>2</sub># in sb<sub>1</sub>'s hands touching sb<sub>2</sub>'s body part> He had him by the throat/hair.  $\bf 5$  <#living thing<sub>1</sub>/sth<sub>1</sub># is with #body (part)/sth<sub>2</sub># as part of the living thing<sub>1</sub>/sth<sub>1</sub>> She has silky hair and this wood a silky texture. She had no strength to run. The house has two floors. The year has twelve months. The Green Party now has nearly 50,000 members.  $\bf 6$  <#thing<sub>1</sub># is with #sth seen# as part of thing<sub>1</sub>> She

has a beautiful appearance. The valley has beautiful scenery. 7 < #living thing that can change the place# is with #body part# in a position> He had his head down. 8 < #sb<sub>1</sub> # is with #mental event<sub>1</sub> done by sb<sub>1</sub> who wants sth# when  $event_1$  is  $sb_1$ 's part> He has an ambition to become a singer. I have a brilliant idea/plan/strategy. I have nothing against them. He had intelligence to escape. She has concern and love for her children as well as great expectations about them. 9 <#sb<sub>1</sub># is with #mental event done by sb2 strong who does (not) expect sb1 to do sth#> I have my rights and my responsibilities. You have my assent. 10 <#living thing<sub>1</sub> that can change place# is with #body event/body state# as a part of thing<sub>1</sub> > He has good health. **11** <#sb<sub>1</sub># is with #mental events# as sb<sub>1</sub>'s part> She has wit and intelligence. He has a brilliant mind and a belief in extraterrestrials. Man has reason and a choice of actions. 12 <#sb<sub>1</sub># is with #{mental} event done by sb<sub>2</sub> when sb<sub>1</sub> is affected by sb<sub>2</sub>#> She had a compliment from him, but also a complaint. May I have your attention! She had help from her friends. 13 <#living thing# is with #bad and strong body state#> She has arthritis and a broken ankle. I have a headache. 14 < #sb<sub>1</sub> # is with #strong mental event done by sb<sub>1</sub> who does not know# She had no doubts. 15 <#sb<sub>1</sub># is with (and makes sb<sub>2</sub> know about) #good feeling#> Have pity on him. Have mercy on us. Have a goodness to leave now. **16** <#event<sub>1</sub> done by use of language by a lot of sb more than one# is with #sth that has just been mentioned# as part of event<sub>1</sub> ...as the rumour has it. (Have 5 is called inalienable possession.)

As is often the case, a part of a definition that refers to what is typical, may form a separate sememe. In  $have\ 4$ , what was typical in  $have\ 1$  ({in sb's hands}) comes to the fore and becomes diagnostic in the definition, while 'is with power to use', which was diagnostic in  $have\ 2$ , becomes an implication, as in  $have\ 4$ , 8, and 11.4

Let us concentrate on 'be with', which appears in sememes 4–16. The sentence

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> John has it  $\neq$  It's John's because in its definition the possessive morpheme 's does not contain {which is in sb's hand(s)}.

(19a) The garden is with a table.

is synonymous with

(19b) The garden has a table.

and is referentially (partially) synonymous with

(19c) There is a table in the garden.

Another sentence,

(20a) The house is with a pond

is synonymous with

(20b) The house has a pond,

and it can be paraphrased as

(20c) There is a pond beside the house.

In both sentences there is a functional proximity of the garden/house and a table/pond respectively. In (19) a table is a part of the garden, proven by

(21) I like the garden, especially the table,

while in (20) a pond is not a part of the house. Therefore,

(22) \*I like the house, especially the pond (cf. Grzegorek 1977: 13).

What is common to both, however, is the idea of what is called here functional proximity, of a strong association in the speaker's mind

between the notions of 'garden/house' and 'table/pond'. Namely, in these sentences 'garden' and 'table' as well as 'house' and 'pond', go together as a whole. If the speaker wanted to describe a situation in which there is a fly near flowers, he/she could not say

(23a) \*The flower is with a fly.

or

(23b) \*The flower has a fly/

because *flower* and *fly* are not in functional proximity. If *bee* is substituted for *fly*, the sentence becomes acceptable, because bees alight and feed on flowers. Also, once the scene becomes a part of a painting, the latter two sentences become acceptable because a flower and a fly make a whole in the picture.

The notion of functional proximity has already occurred as a typical feature of *have* 2, connected with the notion of use, i.e. as '{when living thing<sub>1</sub> is at the same place and time as thing<sub>2</sub> {in living thing<sub>1</sub>'s hand(s)}}'.

In a crowded bus, the closeness of the speaker to other commuters is undeniable. And yet one cannot say

(24) \*I had with me fifty people on the bus.

because the proximity is not of a functional kind and commuters do not make use of the fact that they are close to one another. They are rather mentally distant, unlike in

(25) I have with me Professor Jones, who will help you explain this.

Similarly, Lindstromberg says:

(26a) "\*Ann's in the garden with a table.

[...] is completely vague about any association between Ann and a table. It is not even easy to infer an association. But if a hint of some association is given, then use of *with* becomes markedly more possible. Thus we might construe [(26b)] as suggesting that Ann is very attached to a recent purchase and likes admiring it at close range.

[(26b)] Ann is in the garden with her new table" (1998: 209).

This means that for the notion of functional proximity there has to be a mental bond of attraction, similar to magnetic attraction, to enable the realization of 'be with' (or be with) and have.

Can the semantic gloss 'is with' (or 'be with') be identified with have?<sup>5</sup> For one thing, 'have' is obviously a one-morpheme item that can be atomized into notions of being (= 'is' or 'be') and of functional proximity (= 'with'). It is evident that 'be with' consists of two semantic elements, the first — an amalgam of 'being', a semantic prime denoting mere existence and much simpler than 'having', and the second — 'with', linguistically defined as 'in same (= not different) parts of space and time'<sup>6</sup>. Secondly, have creates an illusion of being a transitive verb, with its object, while be with is obviously intransitive<sup>7</sup>.

Although some instances of the functional proximity *have* could be glossed as 'be with power to use' in the manner of *have* 1 or 2, such a paraphrase would be more complicated, less direct and would sound unnatural. E.g.:

(27a) She has a lot of love for her children.

(27b) ? She is with power to use her love for her children.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Semes (within single quotation marks) are metalinguistic notions, which hopefully exist in the minds of speakers. No definition, even with the most exact semes, can totally equal its *definiendum* because, as ancient philosophers knew, to reduce something to its components is to destroy the whole and weaken the unifying force. On the other hand, the primary (shadow) meaning exerts influence on the secondary (reflected) meanings of the same lexeme (cf. Hlebec 2010: 47). Therefore, if two sememes of two different lexemes have the same definition, they are still not fully synonymous.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Therefore, *She has silky hair* can be atomistically paraphrased as 'She is in the same part of space (i.e. her body space) as her hair, which is silky'.

<sup>7</sup> According to Topy's (1074), 700 the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> According to Isačenko (1974: 76), the meaning if *have* can be analyzed as be + transitivity (quoted in Stojanović 1996: 205), which is only partially true.

More often, such a paraphrase is patently wrong, as in

- (28a) He had no strength to run.
- (28b) \*He was without power to use his strength to run.

because (28b) paradoxically implies that he did have strength to run but was without power to use it.

The following sentence, which illustrates have 5

(29) He has both arms, though he cannot use the left one due to paralysis.

shows that the notion of using has to be dropped from the minimal definition of this sememe even when the subject is human. However, an extension within an alloseme of *have* 5 (marked by the braces) is possible: <#sb# is with #body (part)# {with physical power to use the body (part)}. A combination of a locative adverbial and *have* 5 is not allowed:

(30) \*Her face had the ivory tinge of atribine on it (Stojanović 1996: 208; cf. Mihailović 1976: 112).

In most sememes of this group, there occurs the seme 'part', and even where it is absent from the definition, it is at least implied. Thus 'appearance' in *have* 6 is part of her (i.e. of 'she'), proven by

(31) I like her, especially her appearance.

(cf. sentence (21)), the seme 'ambition' in *have* 8 is part of him (i.e. of 'he'), etc. This fact seems to be closely connected with the notion of functional proximity, because being a part of something is the most obvious instance of functional proximity.

When *have* refers to the body parts, it is the converse of 'be part of'. Thus,

(32a) She has long legs.

is the converse of (stylistically awkward)

(32b) Long legs are part of her.

and

(33a) The valley has beautiful scenery.

is the converse of

(33b) Beautiful scenery is part of the valley.

(34a) She had doubts/secrets.

(34b) Doubts/Secrets were part of her (thinking).

(35a) He has good health.

(35b) Good health is part of him.

(36) ...the rumour has it.

(36<sup>1</sup>) ...it is part of the rumour.

This comes as a normal consequence of the seme 'part' being mentioned or implied in the definitions<sup>8</sup>. Such sentences can often be paraphrased by the literary construction *be possessed of*, as in

(34c) She was possessed of doubts/secrets.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In a way, have a book is a shortened version of have the power to use a book, which means that have 1 of have a book is semantically derived from have 5 in have the power. It may seem strange that the primary meaning should be derived from a secondary one, but the addition of the seme 'use' in combination with 'have power' has promoted the sememe 'have the power to use' to the primary member of the lexeme have. To gain the power of control seems to be the propulsive force in the development of man. However, in MEDAL (s. v. have) characteristic is mentioned before possession, so that this meaning of have has been implicitly treated as primary there.

This construction is the result of the fact that the semantic subject of (34) is not 'she', which has the role of experiencer, and 'she' is affected by having doubts/secrets, while doubts/secrets are viewed as strong. This is manifested in the passive *was possessed*. However, this is not an instance of the usual passive, such as could be derived from

(34d) \*Doubts/Secrets possessed her,

and therefore *of* (for 'part') is used as a preposition rather than *by* or *with*.

The functional proximity of *have* 6 is called *representative possession* (Stojanović 1996: 11). *Have* 8 and 11, which are examples of celebrative possession (cf. Stojanović 1996: 11), are quite alike. The difference that exists between them is similar to that between countable and uncountable nouns.

## 3. Relation

For *have* with relatives, friends and members of a community in the object (*have* 17) a different definition should be used. *Has* in

(37a) John has a son.

cannot be paraphrased as 'John is with power to do whatever he wants with his one son' (although Wierzbicka proposed this strange paraphrase in 1988: 345), not even as 'John is with one son' because John may be separated from his son and actually may have never met him. But if we substitute *exist* for *be*, the paraphrase is improved. 'John exists with one son' (= 'John exists and there is also a male person that he has begotten') is what is really conveyed by sentence (37a). The same argument applies to

(38) John has a boss.

(= 'John exists and there is also a person that officially controls his work'). It is unusual to join *son* and *boss* in one sentence, as in

(39) John has a son and a boss.

because of typically different roles that the 'possessor' plays here. However,

(40) John has a boss and a domineering son, who both mistreat him.

is acceptable, since John's positions become the same in both roles. Therefore 'be with a strong relationship' seems to be a handy umbrella definition for all kinds of such parallel existences accompanied by an important relationship.<sup>9</sup>

17 <#living thing $_1$ # is in a strong relation with #living thing $_2$ #> I have few friends. How many children have they? He had no equals. Who can we have as treasurer? We have a man who comes in regularly.  $^{10}$  18 <#sb $_1$ # is connected with #mental events done by a lot of sb $_2$  more than one who think of sb $_1$  for a long time#> have a role/a good reputation 19 <#sb# is associated with #sth done by use of language#> He has a strange name. (The possession in have 17 is the so called "reciprocal possession" (in Stojanović, 1996: 11)).

There is a converse antonymy of (37a) as

(37b) John's son has a father,

although sentence (37b) is tautological. Admittedly, sememes *have* 17-19 are like *have* 1-16 in containing the semes 'is with' in their definitions, but proximity is much less strong in the latter group, and is especially weak in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> MEDAL and OALD also classify this type of *have* under the heading RELATION.

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  The notion of relation in this sentence is quite similar to the notion of possession in the sentence with maid, illustrating  $have\ 1$ , which shows that the merging of sememes has to be posed as a possibility in some cases.

18 and 19. That the grammatical subject in sentences with *have* 18 and 19 play a rather passive role is most obvious in

(41) Van Gogh has a worldwide reputation as a painter.

because (41) has become true only after Van Gogh's death. It is 'a lot of sb more than one' and 'use of language [by a lot of sb more than one]' that gives strength to this type of having.

# 4. Experience

'Experience' appears as a common seme occurring in the analyses of the following sememes:

20 <#living thing<sub>1</sub> that can change position# experiences #sth# to help the thing<sub>1</sub> > have an operation/an injection/a driving lesson **21** <#sb<sub>1</sub># experiences #bad event# She had an accident. We have had enough of violence. 22 < #sb<sub>1</sub> # experiences (and makes sb<sub>2</sub> know about) #bad psychological event<sup>11</sup>#> She has a horror of spiders. How dare you have the impudence? 23 <#sb# experiences #good situation#> I have an opportunity to sell the car. I'm not having much success. I had a good time. 24 <#sb# experiences #bad situation#> We didn't have much difficulty. He has a problem with his wife and a lot of worries in business. I had my car stolen. Last year the place was so full that we had people sleeping on the floor. 12 25 < #living thing that can change one's place # experiences #time event/weather#> He had a long working life. I had a boring afternoon. They've had snow up in Scotland. 26 <#sb# experiences #sth done by use of language by sb who has power#> She had no formal instruction in music. 27 < #thing# (as if) experiences #event#> The stocks had a fast run-up. The book has a page missing. 28 <#sb# makes and experiences #event done by sb more than one#> They had a friendly meeting and then a quarrel. Shall we have a game of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The seme 'psychological event' includes 'mental event' and 'feeling'.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> The semantic object (object directive) is 'people sleeping on the floor', which connotes a bad situation.

chess? We had elections and a holiday last week. **29** <#sb<sub>1</sub># does and experiences #body event# whose name is derived from a verb, which is good for sb<sub>1</sub>, that is possibly repeated, lasting for a short time><sup>13</sup> She had a walk. Have a look. **30** <#sb<sub>1</sub># makes and experiences #situation with sb<sub>2</sub># when sb<sub>2</sub> is in sb<sub>1</sub>'s space in a strong relationship> He had the guests in the dining room. He has his friend staying with him at present. We had them to stay. **31** <#sb<sub>1</sub># experiences #substance<sub>1</sub># in sb<sub>1</sub>'s body when sb<sub>1</sub> makes substance<sub>1</sub> come through sb<sub>1</sub>'s mouth> They had a cake and a lemonade. **32** <#living thing<sub>1</sub> that can change one's place# comes to experience #baby# that thing<sub>1</sub> has made> My wife had twins yesterday. **33** <#sb<sub>1</sub># experiences #sth# that sb<sub>1</sub> has made> He has four paintings, five articles and six O levels.

The occurrence of the seme 'experience' in this group can be explained by imagining experience as a part of a living thing, that part being at the same time a kind of possession of the living thing, as explained above. For this reason, the dividing line between the functional proximity group and the experience group is not clear-cut. To experience something quite often amounts to being with something registered in mind, and thus can be considered as a kind of 'being with'. *Have* 28-33 show elements of causation as well, which is manifested by 'make' and 'do'. The meaning of experience has given rise to the auxiliary *have* used for the perfect phase.

In Fromm's opinion, have is not appropriate to express experience if it is not a bodily sensation. Speaking in linguistic terms, this means that the influence of the primary meaning of possession is reflected in the other meanings. "Some decades ago, instead of' I have a problem' the patient [seeking a psychoanalyst's help] probably would have said, 'I am troubled'; instead of 'I have insomnia', 'I cannot sleep'; instead of 'I have a happy marriage, 'I am happily married'.

The more recent speech style indicates the prevailing high degree of alienation. By saying `I have a problem' instead of `I am troubled',

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> An extensive discussion on this use of have has been presented in Wierzbicka (1988) and Dixon (2005), from which the present definition originates.

subjective experience is eliminated: the I of experience is replaced by the it of possession. I have transformed my feeling into something I possess, the problem. But 'problem' is an abstract expression for all kinds of difficulties. I cannot have a problem, because it is not a thing that can be owned  $[\ldots]$ .

Of course, one can argue that insomnia is a physical symptom like a sore throat or a toothache, and that it is therefore as legitimate to say that one *has* insomnia as it is to say that one has a sore throat. Yet there is a difference: a sore throat or a toothache is a bodily sensation that can be more or less intense, but it has little psychical quality. One can *have* a sore throat, for one has a throat, or an aching tooth, for one has teeth. Insomnia, on the contrary, is not a bodily sensation but a state of mind, that of not being able to sleep" (Fromm 1979: 31).

Have 42 was explained by Fromm as follows. "Incorporating a thing, for instance, by eating or drinking, is an archaic form of possessing it [...] By eating another human being, I acquire that person's powers" (Fromm 1979; 35).

# 5. Knowledge

**34** <#sb# knows #language#> *I have no German.* **35** <#sb# comes to know #mental event that makes sb know sth#> *She had bad news and a piece of advice from him. He had no information about her.* 

In have 34 knowledge of a language is a special kind both of experience and of mental possession, as well as 35 ('news', 'information'. 'advice' or 'fact'). Have 35 relates to have 34 in the same way as have 3 to have 2, i.e. the inchoative aspect appears.

#### 6. Causation

In addition to *have* 28-33, a large group of the sememes of *have* (36–43) contains causative meanings, rendered by 'make' in their definitions.

**36** <#sb# makes #situation# $^{14}$ > I'll have the TV set in this room. Have him call me. I had my assistant (to) run the errand. I had him dismissed. She had him reading poetry aloud. I've had my hair cut. The king had his portrait painted by a famous artist. **37** <#sb<sub>1</sub>/sth# makes sb<sub>2</sub> experience #situation with a strong emotion#> The problem had me stunned. She had us worried. His sad story almost had us in tears. 38 <#sb1# makes #sb<sub>2</sub># come to be in strong relationship with sb<sub>1</sub> > She didn't want to have him in marriage. 39 <#sb1 male# causes #sb2 female# to be with sb<sub>1</sub> doing sexual event> (informal) He had her on the sofa. **40** <#sb<sub>1</sub># does not want to make #bad 15 behaviour/event# that sb1 does not like, come to be not> I won't have such behaviour any longer! I won't have the dog in the house! 41 <# sb1 strong {not mentioned}# makes #sb2#</pre> do sth<sub>1</sub> good for sb<sub>1</sub> and bad for sb<sub>2</sub> when sb<sub>2</sub> does not know that sth<sub>1</sub> will be bad for sb<sub>2</sub>> (slang) I think you've been had in this deal. 42 <#sb<sub>1</sub># makes #sb<sub>2</sub># be less strong than sb<sub>1</sub> in a game/argument> (informal) I had him there. Your opponent in the debate had you on every issue. 43 <#sth# makes #part of event<sub>1</sub> done because of event<sub>2</sub>#> have effect/impact /influence/result

Dixon's words (Dixon 2005: 198), the causative sense of *have* refers to the causer bringing something about, arranging that something be happening (durative aspect). Whoever or whatever is a cause of something is invested with the power of creation, which accounts for the

<sup>14</sup> The seme 'situation' in a directive can correspond to a noun phrase or a non-finite clause. Therefore, the semantic object in *have* 36 is *the TV set in this room, him call me, my assistant* (to) run the errand, him dismissed, etc.

<sup>15</sup> Spaced text in directives refers to contextually induced interpretation. In our example this means that the behaviour or event that becomes the object of *have* 40 will always be taken as bad, no matter whether 'bad' is part of the definition of the object noun or not.

use of *have* in this sense. The notion of power is realized in various ways, not only as a salient definitional feature of *have* 1–3, but also as an implication in this group, and that is the link of the group with *have* 1 and *have* 2.

Fromm's comment on *have* 39 would be: "[O]nly in those who must *have* what they like will this mental enjoyment [in interpersonal relations of a man and a woman] habitually result in the desire for sexual possession" (Fromm 1979: 113).

The possession of *have* 46 is called *resultative possession* (Stojanović 1996:11).

# 7. Expectation

**44** <#sb<sub>1</sub># is expected to make #event/situation# according to #mental event done by sb<sub>1</sub> strong who wants sb<sub>1{2}</sub> to do sth#> I have six orders and a job to do. He has a demand to clean the room and a garden to attend to 16 **45** <#sb/sth# is expected to do sth because the speaker wants it> You have to be careful. I was having to work every weekend. **46** <#sb# tends to do sth in connection with #event# as expected {because of the situation}> I have to go. Much has still to be done. **47** <#sth# tends to be inevitably> Just tonight the train had to be late. Things have to get better. **48** #sb# is expected to make #event done by a group of sb more than one who are together for short time# have an appointment/concert/meeting/party/show/trial

The last group of *have's* contains 'expected to do' or 'tend to do as expected' as defining semes. Again, it is the idea of power, this time unstated, of somebody who expects a situation to be created, that gives *have* these meanings.

Modal verbs (like *should*, *can*, *might*, *ought*) also contain expectation as an important seme. Dual means of negation for *have* (*I* 

 $<sup>^{16}</sup>$  With a double object directive, the speaker usually must opt for one of the two, and not apply both at the same time. Therefore, this sentence probably creates a zeugma and *have* 44 as defined here yields two sememes.

haven't or I don't have)<sup>17</sup> shows that have sometimes behaves as a semi-modal, which is in line with the fact that it shares the seme 'expectation' with true modals. In fact, have in 45-47 may be considered as an auxiliary.<sup>18</sup>

Have in most meanings cannot be passivised (cf. Wierzbicka (1988: 44-5). The definitional paraphrase shows why it is so: sb has sth = 'sb is with power to use sth' > '\*sth is with power to be used by sb'. The same holds good for 'is (be) with', 'is (be) in relation', and 'is (be) connected/associated with'. It is the seme 'be' in the definition that is most responsible for opposing passivisation here. However, inchoative (= 'come to be') of have 3 enables occasional passivisation because the change made by inchoativity implies activity that affects the object of the active sentence, and affecting the change of a grammatical object is another characteristic of passivisation (Dixon 2005: 360).

The seme 'know' also does not enable passivisation because knowledge of something does not affect that something. The verb *know* can be used in the passive, but with a modified meaning, that of a lot of people, which makes a strong psychological subject — a third factor in passivisation.

- (42) \*German is known by a lot of people in Europe.
- (43) The pilots were known to be experienced.

<sup>17</sup> "When we use *have* as a lexical verb in a dynamic sense, we form negatives and questions with *do* as an operator. Dynamic *have* can be used with progressive and perfect tenses and the imperative: We don't have a great deal of time. Did you have a good trip? It was all some frightful dream he was having. Priscilla's had a bit of a sticky time; lately have a good game. Have as a dynamic lexical verb (questions and negatives with *do*) shows a wealth of meanings in the many common fixed phrases we use it in: to have... a baby/a bath/breakfast/a chat/a dream/a fright/a good time//a holiday/a look/a moment/a peep/a quarrel/a relationship/a shower/a swim/an understanding/a word etc." (Broughton 1990: 125/126).

Is Zimmermann's explanation of the expansive use of the auxiliary have on account of be, concentrates on the linguistic structural side of the issue. "As perfect and pluperfect emerged during the Old English period, have was the auxiliary with all transitive and some 'statal' intransitive verbs, whereas be was used with certain intransitive verbs denoting motion or change, so-called 'mutative' verbs, for example cuman, weorpan.[...] During the Middle English period, have appeared more and more with these intransitive verbs and finally replaced be completely in Early Modern English" (Zimmermann 1973: 107). "To summarize — there were probably two main reasons for the replacement of be by have:

- (1) Since be was an auxiliary of the active and the passive voice there were structurally ambiguous sentences such as he is driven.
- (2) Both have and be were used with the same verb, for example he is sailed, he has sailed the hoat.

The disappearance of *wurthen* as a passive auxiliary added another reason, because the functional load of *be* [...] became too high, which started or accelerated the structural change" (Zimmermann 1973: 116-7). We believe that in addition to the factors mentioned above, some room has to be left for the cognitive change in the minds of the speakers.

Causation sometimes poses a restriction on the use of the passive of *have*. This depends on the strength of the notion of the causer. If it is so great that it affects the object noun referent, then the passive is possible, as in *have* 41. In this sememe the passive is imposed by the meaning of being a victim affected by cheating.

When causation concerns a situation as an object (see footnote 14), the passive is ruled out either because the entity in the clause is not affected by the activity of the subject, or, more often, because turning the clause into the passive would produce ungrammatical sentences

- (44) \*The TV set in this room will be had by me.
- (45a) \*He was had dismissed by me.
- (45b) \*Him dismissed was had by me.
- (46) \*The King's portrait had been had painted by a famous artist.

This is also reflected in the behaviour of the lexeme *make*. When *make* means simply 'cause', there is no passive, as in

(47) It made me cry ( = 'It caused my crying').

When the meaning is 'force', with a strong causer, as in

(48) We were made to work 12 hours a day.

the passive is normal.

Another category of *have* without passive is the experience *have*, since its object is never viewed as affected. What is affected here is the experiencer. While

(49) The cakes were eaten in a jiffy.

is acceptable,

(49<sup>1</sup>) \*The cakes were had in a jiffy.

is not, which proves that have 'eat' is not fully synonymous with eat. The latter verb emphasizes the use of the organs and the change of the substance taken into the body (<#living thing1 that can change one's place# makes #substance# come to be in thing1's body through the mouth>), while have is simpler and does not contain these features in the definition, which are only implied.

Unlike *have*, the verb *own*, which means 'be with legal power to use', may be used in the passive. This indicates that the slight difference in the definitions of *have* 1 (<#living thing<sub>1</sub># is with power to use #thing<sub>2</sub>/time/sth#) and *own* (<#sb# is with legal power to use #thing/sth#) accounts for this phenomenon, although *have* 1 has an alloseme <<#sb# is with legal power to use #thing/sth#>>.

Here the definitional seme 'legal' exerts the decisive influence due to its strength.

The semes 'be' (in 'be with' or 'be expected') and 'know' prohibit the progressive aspect because 'be' and' know' imply a state, which is viewed holistically (as a whole), while the progressive takes a look at an activity as consisting of parts. In have 37 and 42, the progressive aspect is disallowed because the meaning is that of an instantaneous act, i.e. a change happens in a moment when somebody comes to feel an emotion or at the end of a game or argument. There seems to be a vacillation in the usage of the progressive aspect in have 45 and 48, probably because in these definitions both causation ('do' or 'make') and the existence of expectation ('is expected') occur.

When the defining seme is 'experience' (in *have* 20-33), the progressive becomes acceptable if no stativity is implied, as in

- (50) We're having a good time at Monte Carlo.
- (51) We're having a test/an exam/a lesson/class this morning (Leech 1991: 173).
- (52) I was having difficulties.
- (53) We' re having the kids for the weekend.

In *have* 1, 2, 17 and 44-48 there seems to be duality in making interrogative and negative sentences (by means of *do* or without it).

Linguistically, if the seme 'good' and 'bad' are taken into account, have is mostly neutral as regards evaluation. It has positive connotations in three sememes that contain the seme 'good' (have 15, 23, 29), negative in four sememes with 'bad' (have 13, 22, 24, 40), and it is partly negative and partly positive in have 41.

The expression *have got*, which is often used instead of *have* 1 and *have* 2 emphasizes acquisition (possession *sensu strictu*), partonomy, and strong relation.

The verb *possess* is a partial synonym of *have*. "*Possess* indicates that there is a strong emotional or mental connection between owner and possession" (Dixon 2005: 123, 363). *Possess* takes the names of objects as well as notions of quality, ability, knowledge or emotion as grammatical objects. Another semi-synonym is *own*. "*Own* implies legal or official right to a thing" (Dixon 2005:123).

The linguistic findings in this article parallel psychological and philosophical thinking. "Human existence requires that we have, keep, take care of, and use certain things in order to survive. This holds true for our bodies, for food, shelter, clothing and for the tools necessary to produce our needs. This form of having may be called existential having because it is rooted in human existence, it is a rationally directed impulse in the pursuit of staying alive — in contrast to the *characterological having* [...], which is a passionate drive to retain and keep that is not innate, but that has developed as the result of the impact of social conditions on the human species as it is biologically given" (Fromm 1979: 90). In the words of Berdyayev, "In the western bourgeois society the value of man is overly determined by what the man possesses rather than by what he is by himself" (Berdyayev 2006: 105, translated by B. H.).

In many sememes of *have* there is a pervading idea of power. The notion of power is ambivalent, just like the connotations of *have*. Fromm distinguishes between 'the power of' as an inner capacity, like love, which is positive, and 'the power over', such as domination and irrational authority, which is negative (Fromm 1971: passim). As stated by Erich

Fromm: "[M]y [non-alienated] activity is a manifestation of my powers" (1979: 94).

The only things that we naturally and inherently have (possess) are our mind and body. Says Toševski: "Man has nothing so strong and so personal as his memory. it is his only treasure that he possesses (2011: 12, translated by B.H.). According to the semantic definitions of functional proximity *have*, which include cases of inherent possession, in these definitions 'power' is not given as a salient feature but is only implied, probably because this kind of power ('power of') is given us from birth. It is power to use, which often (but not invariantly) becomes 'power over', that is a salient feature of material possession *have*. <sup>19</sup>

## References

Bergyayev, N.: Berđajev, N. (2006). *Sudbina čoveka u savremenom svetu* [Man's Destiny in the Contemporary World]. Belgrade: Logos.

Broughton, G. (1990). *The Penguin English Grammar A-Z for Advanced Students*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Dixon, R.M.W. (2005). *A Semantic Approach to English grammar.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Fromm, E. (1971). Man for Himself. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Fromm, E. (1979). To Have or to Be. London: Abacus.

Goddard, C. & Wierzbicka, A. (eds.). (2002). *Meaning and Universal Grammar. Theory and Empirical Findings.* Amsterdam/Philadelphia; John Benjamins.

Grzegorek, M. (1977). 'A note on semantic representation of lexical items and on lexical gaps'. Poznan: *PSCL* 7: 5-20.

Hlebec, B. (1998). Connect Your Words. Belgrade: Trebnik.

Hlebec, B. (2007). English Semantics. Belgrade: Čigoja štampa.

<sup>19</sup> Schopenhauer (1916: Chapter 1) divided the goods of human life into three categories: (1) personality (i.e. health, strength, beauty, temperament, moral character, intelligence (2) possession (i.e. property owned) and (3) what man represents (honour, position and fame). It is easy to recognize in them three types of having: inalienable possession (= 1), possession *sensu strictu* (= 2), and "possession' of *have* 18 (=3).

- Hlebec, B. (2008a). 'Collocations with *old*, *young* and *new* and their Serbian correspondents'. Belgrade: *ELLSSAC Proceedings* vol I, 171-192.
- Hlebec, B. (2008b). 'Kolokacijska metoda semantičke analize (na primeru imenice *pažnja*)' [Collocational method of semantic analysis (with the example of the noun *pažnja*')] *Semantička proučavanja srpskog jezika*. *Srpski jezik u svetlu savremenih lingvističkih teorija* vol. 2, Belgrade: SANU, 65-75.
- Hlebec, B. (2008c). "Predikativni instrumental" u svetlu kolokacijske analize' [*Predicative instrumental* in the light of collocational analysis'] *Južnoslovenski filolog* LXIV, 535-650.
- Hlebec, B. (2010). *English Semantics for University Students*. Belgrade: Čigoja štampa.
- Hlebec, B. (2011). 'The portrait of *wild* (in the collocational technique)'. Banja Luka: *Filolog* III, 121-130.
- Isačenko, A. (1974). "On 'have' and 'be' languages" in: Michael Flier (ed.) Slavic Forum: Essays in: Linguistics and Literature. The Hague/Paris: Mouton.
- Leech, G. (1991) *An A-Z of English Grammar Usage.* Walton-on-Thames: Nelson.
- Lindstromberg, S. (1998). *English Prepositions Explained*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Lyons, J. (1977). Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mihailović, Lj. (1976). "Differences in the surface structure realizations of stative locative clauses in English and Serbo-Croatian'. In: R. Filipović (ed.) Zagreb: *YSCECPS. Reports* 10. 109-120.
- Schopenhauer, A. (1916). *Aphorismen zur Lebensweisheit. Arthur Schopenhauer's sämtliche Werke.* Vol. 5. F. A. Brockhouse.
- Stojanović, S. (1996). Binarne relacije posesije u engleskom i srpskohrvatskom jeziku. [Binary Relations of Possession in the English and Serbo-Croat languages] Belgrade: Faculty of Philology.
- Toševski, J. (2011). *Čarobni mozak*. [The Wonderful Brain] Belgrade: Evro-Giunti.
- Wierzbicka, A. (1988). *The Semantics of Grammar*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

- Wiggins, D. (1971). On sentence-sense, word-sense and difference of word-sense. Towards a philosophical theory of dictionaries. In Steinberg, D.D. & Jakobovitys, L.A. (eds.). *Semantics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zimmermann, R. (1973). Structural change in the English auxiliary system: On the replacement of *be* by *have*. *Folia Linguistica* Vol. VI, 1/2. 107-117.

## **Dictionaries**

- COBUILD (1990) *Collins COBUILD English Language Dictionary*. London: Collins.
- MEDAL (2007) *Macmillan English Dictionary for Advanced Learners*. Oxford: Macmillan & A. & C. Black.
- OALD (2003) Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SOED (1973) *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Paper submitted: December 1, 2011 Paper revised: December 5, 2011 Paper accepted: December 10, 2011